Workmen\u27s Compensation and the Place of Contract by Loadman, David J.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 21 | Issue 3 Article 9
1-1970
Workmen's Compensation and the Place of
Contract
David J. Loadman
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
David J. Loadman, Workmen's Compensation and the Place of Contract, 21 Hastings L.J. 731 (1970).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol21/iss3/9
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND THE
PLACE OF CONTRACT
The California workmen's compensation system, as presently ap-
plied, provides unequal protection for California residents employed in-
side and outside the state. For example, under the present law if two
California residents were to suffer the same injury while performing sim-
ilar duties for the same employer, it is possible that one could qualify
for workmen's compensation in California while the other could not.
The latter individual may be able to claim benefits in another state that
may or may not be as remunerative as those to which he would have
been entitled in California, or he may go uncompensated altogether.
This inequality is made more acute by the fact that while numer-
ous residents are denied coverage, some nonresidents may qualify even
though they have never entered California.1 Moreover, it is possible
for a resident and a nonresident to suffer the same injury under the
same conditions, and only the nonresident be able to claim compen-
sation in California. These anomalous situations are made possible by
provisions2 in the California workmen's compensation laws giving any-
one who qualifies for employee status and who has entered into a con-
tract of hire within the state the right to file a claim for benefits under the
California laws. There is no provision, however, that insures cover-
age for resident employees unless they can establish that (a) they en-
tered into a contract of hire in California, (b) they are regularly em-
ployed here,4 or (c) they were injured here under circumstances other
than those provided for in Labor Code section 3600.5(b).5 This is the
1. See notes 63-65 & accompanying text infra.
2. See CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3600.5, 5305. For the language of these sections
see notes 3 & 5 and text accompanying note 71 infra.
3. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600.5(a) provides: "If an employee who has been hired
or is regularly employed in the state receives personal injury by accident arising out of
and in course of such employment outside of this state, he, or his dependents in the
case of his death, shall be entitled to compensation according to the law of this state."
4. Id.
5. In Pacific Emps. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 10 Cal. 2d 567, 75 P.2d
1058, af 'd, 306 U.S. 493 (1938), compensation was awarded a claimant whose only
contact with this state was that his injury occurred here. Coverage on the basis of
injury alone was limited in 1955 by the enactment of CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600.5(b)
which provides:
"Any employee who has been hired outside of this state and his employer shall be
exempted from the provisions of this division while such employee is temporarily
within this state doing work for his employer if such employer has furnished work-
men's compensation insurance coverage under the workmen's compensation insurance
laws or similar laws of a state other than California, so as to cover such employee's
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result of an unfortunate perpetuation of an inappropriate fiction used
by early 20th century lawmakers to explicate a novel system in terms of
long-established common law principles. As presently applied, the
California act impairs the basic principles of a workmen's compensa-
tion system by allowing the safety and well-being of those with whom
a state should be most concerned, its residents, to turn on the fortuitous
circumstance of their place of work or injury, or the place where the
contract of employment was consummated. This Note will attempt to
expose the misbegotten heritage of the place-of-contract theory as well
as the disadvantages of applying such an ill-suited standard in the pres-
ent system.
Origin of the Contract Theory
The first states to enact workmen's compensation laws did so
hesitantly, fearing the constitutional objections that would inevitably
follow such revolutionary legislation. To minimize the effect of ob-
jections to the concept of employer liability without fault for an em-
ployee's injuries, some acts were made elective, at the option of the em-
ployer.' If the employer elected to come within the act, it was said
that a new contractual relationship was created between the employer
and the employee.7  The provisions of the statute were "read into" the
contract of employment,' and the right to compensation was based upon
employment while in this state; provided, the extraterritorial provisions of this division
are recognized in such other state and provided employers and employees who are
covered in this state are likewise exempted from the application of the workmen's com-
pensation insurance or similar laws of such other state. The benefits under the Work-
men's Compensation Insurance Act or similar laws of such other state, or other
remedies under such act or such laws, shall be the exclusive remedy against such em-
ployer for any injury, whether resulting in death or not, received by such employee
while working for such employer in this state.
"A certificate from the duly authorized officer of the appeals board or similar
department of another state certifying that the employer of such other state is insured
therein and has provided extraterritorial coverage insuring his employees while working
withn this state shall be prima facie evidence that such employer carries such work-
men's compensation insurance."
For a discussion of this subsection see text accompanying note 69 infra. See gen-
erally REVIEW OF SELECTED 1955 CODE LEGISLATION § 98 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed.
1955); 44 CALIF. L. REV. 387 (1955).
6. E.g., Berry v. M.F. Donovan & Sons, 120 Me. 457, 115 A. 250 (1921); Barn-
hart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 N.Y. 531, 125 N.E. 675 (1920); West v.
Kozer, 104 Ore. 94, 206 P. 542 (1922); Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S.E. 862
(1916). For a list of additional states and accompanying cases see 71 C.J. Work-
men's Compensation § 2 n.30(a) (1935).
7. Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 142, 151 A.
518, 522 (1930); Baker v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 145 Kan. 273, 280, 65
P.2d 284, 288 (1937); Smith v. Van Noy Interstate Co., 150 Tenn. 25, 31, 262 S.W.
1048, 1049 (1924).
8. Sneeden v. Industrial Comm'n, 366 Ill. 552, 558, 10 N.E.2d 327, 330 (1937);
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"an agreement implied by the law."9 Thus, the contract of employment
became the source of liability, and actions or proceedings to secure
compensation were, in some jurisdictions, declared to be suits upon
contract 0 or for breach of contract." When it became necessary to
determine to what extent the local act applied to persons injured out-
side of the state, conventional conflict of laws principles for contracts
were applied, for it was well-settled that the legislature had the power
to enforce a contract between an employer and employee that was extra-
territorial in effect.'2
Those states that enacted compulsory statutes's met with immediate
difficulty in trying to explain this new liability as one arising out of
contract. 14 It is obvious that if an act is compulsory and thus not open
to rejection by the parties,' 5 an essential element of contract, mutual
assent, is lacking.'0 Also, if the right to compensation rested upon con-
tract, it would seem to follow that such right would exist only in cases
of employment contracts made after the passage of the statute. How-
ever, it has never been supposed that any such limitation could be up-
held, 7 and the statute applies even though the contract of employment
was made before the statute went into effect.' 8 Also, if the act is said
Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N.Y. 544, 555, 111 N.E. 351, 354 (1916).
9. American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N.J.L. 436, 437, 92 A.2d, 85, 86 (Sup. Ct.
1914).
10. Woods v. City of La Follette, 185 Tenn. 655, 207 S.W.2d 572 (1947);
Cornett v. City of Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742 (1933); Southern Sur.
Co. v. Morris, 22 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
11. Beckoff v. Dan Creek Mining Co., 6 Alas. 218 (1920).
12. See, e.g., Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 376, 94 A. 372,
376 (1915); BeaU Bros. Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 341 Ill. 193, 197, 173
N.E. 64, 66 (1930); Rounsaville v. Central Ry., 87 N.J.L. 371, 374, 94 A. 392,
393 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N.Y. 544, 549, 111 N.E. 351, 352
(1916).
13. While in elective acts either the employer, the employee, or both may have
the option to accept or reject the act, no such options are conferred in the case of com-
pulsory acts. Under compulsory acts, strict penalties may be provided for noncompli-
ance by the employer. See CAL- LABOR CoDE §§ 3706, 3710-3710.2, 3712, 3715, 4554.
14. See, e.g., Ocean Ace. & Guar. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 Ariz. 275, 257
P. 644 (1927); North Alas. Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 P. 93 (1916);
Note, Contractual Extraterritoriality of Workmen's Compensation Statutes, 80 U. PA. L.
REV. 1139, 1139-40 (1932). See generally Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the
Conflict of Laws, 11 MiNN. L. REv. 329, 332-41 (1927).
15. Besides not being able to reject the act in toto, the parties are unable to alter
or eliminate any particular provision of the act. See Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler
Co., 224 N.Y. 9, 11, 119 N.E. 878, 881 (1918).
16. H. GooDRicH & E. SCOLES, CoNFULcT OF LAWS 186 (4th ed. 1964); 21
MIC. L. REv. 449, 450 (1923); see Davidson v. Payne, 281 F. 544 (D.C. Kan. 1922)
(dealing with an elective act); 37 HAnv. L. RPv. 375, 376 (1924).
17. North Alas. Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 2-3, 162 P. 93 (1916).
18. Drtina v. Charles Tea Co., 281 IMI. 259, 118 N.E. 69 (1917).
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to be "read into" the contract of employment at the time and place of
its inception, subsequent amendments to the act would, under ordinary
contract principles, have no affect on the original obligation. Yet it
has been generally held that the law in force at the time of injury gov-
erns the right to, or liability for, compensation. 9
The California Supreme Court was quick to discern the contra-
dictions that arose when the contract theory was applied to a com-
pulsory system.20 In a case involving an employee who was hired in
San Francisco and injured while working in Alaska, the court first up-
held the jurisdiction of the California Industrial Accident Commission
on the grounds that the workmen's compensation law entered into and
became a part of the employment contract. On rehearing, the court
recanted:
Upon further study, we are satisfied that this view [expressed
at the first hearing] is not tenable. The liability of the employer
to pay compensation arises from the law itself, rather than from any
agreement of the parties. The law operates upon a status, i.e.,
that of employer and employee, and affixes certain rights and
obligations to that status. True, the relationship of employer and
employee has its inception in a contract, but, once the relation is
created, its incidents depend, not upon the agreement of the par-
ties, but upon the provisions of the law. . . . It may well be said
that the rights declared by an elective statute have their origin
and sanction in the agreement of the parties to be bound by the
statute. Under a compulsory statute, however, the correlative
rights and obligations are not founded upon contract.2'
Even more significant is the renunciation of the contract theory
by the United States Supreme Court when it stated that "workmen's
compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that of
implied contract .... ,21 It is unfortunate that some state courts per-
sisted in branding the new obligations placed on the employer as a
form of liability arising out of the employment contract. 3 The better
view, as espoused by the Supreme Court, was to explain the new legis-
lation as having its essence in "the relationship which the employee
19. E.g., Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co., 99 Conn. 307, 121 A. 828
(1923) (holding that the employer's election incorporates the act plus subsequent
amendments); Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768, 443 P.2d 314 (1968); Rosell v. State
Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 164 Ore. 173, 95 P.2d 726 (1939); Bodine v. Department of Labor
and Indus., 29 Wash. 2d 879, 190 P.2d 89 (1948); Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co.,
169 Wis. 106, 170 N.W. 275 (1919). See also GOODRICH & SCOLEs, supra note 14, at
186.
20. See North Alas. Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 P. 93 (1916).
21. Id. at 2, 162 P. at 93 (emphasis added). The Wisconsin Supreme Court
came to a similar conclusion in Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co.. 169 Wis. 106, 113,
170 N.W. 275, 277 (1919).
22. Cudahy v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923).
23. See cases cited notes 7, 8 & 10 supra.
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bears to his employment":
Workmen's compensation legislation rests upon the idea of
status. that is, upon the conception that the injured workman
is entitled to compensation for an injury sustained in the service of
an industry .... The liability is based, not upon any act or omis-
sion of the employer, but upon the existence of the relationship
which the employee bears to the employment .... 24
The authority of the state to regulate this relationship has over-
whelmingly been attributed to its police power rather than its power to
enforce contracts made within its boundaries.25 In support of the con-
stitutionality of Washington's compulsory system, the Supreme Court
said:
We are clearly of the opinion that a state, in the exercise of
its power to pass such legislation as reasonably is deemed to be
necessary to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of its
people, may regulate the carrying on of industrial occupations that
frequently and inevitably produce personal injuries and disability
. .. and may require that these human losses shall be charged
against the industry .... 26
The Contract Theory Today
Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of the contract theory, it has
survived to the extent that presently the most common standard for
determining workmen's compensation coverage is where the contract of
employment was made.27 In fact, many states have incorporated into
their act a provision that an employee is covered if he has been hired
within the state.2  The contractual foundation for this test is not en-
tirely without merit since the application of almost all workmen's com-
pensation systems requires that there be a contract of employment.29 A
24. Cudahy v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923). See also Note, Nature of
Employer's Liability Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 84 U. PA. L. Rnv. 85
(1935).
25. E.g., Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 502
(1923); Western Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 694, 151 P. 398, 401 (1915);
Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 190, 106 N.E.2d 124, 130 (1952);
Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 430, 35 N.W.2d 719, 732 (1949); Mandle v.
Kelly, 229 Miss. 327, 343, 90 So. 2d 645, 649 (1956); Cataldo v. Admiral Inn, Inc.,
227 A.2d 199, 203 (R.I. 1967).
26. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 243 (1917) (empha-
sis added).
27. 3 A. LARsoN, THE LAW OF WoRmEN's COMPENSATiON, §§ 87.11, 87.31
(1968) [hereinafter cited as LARsON]. See generally 3 LARsoN, app. A, table 6.
28. E.g., Aaz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-904A (1956); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85,
§ 4 (Supp. 1969); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-54 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 619 (1967).
29. IA LAR ON § 47. But see CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351. This section recognizes
persons in service under appointment or apprenticeship as employees as well as those
under a contract of hire.
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friendly volunteering of services will not suffice.
Probably the greatest advantage of the contract theory was that it
enabled the application of well-established legal principles to determine
jurisdiction in situations where the employee had contacts with more
than one state. For jurisdictional purposes, the law has always enter-
tained the fiction that every contract has a determinable time and place
of inception. 0 In the workmen's compensation field, this fiction was
preferred to the nebulous characteristics suggested by the terms "status"
or "employment relationship."'" Even California, which had rejected
the contract theory as the basis of liability,3 2 retained it as a practical
device to be used in determining whether its act applied.33  Evidently,
it was thought that such a device would provide the basis for jurisdiction
and also facilitate the rapid disposition of disputed claims. The fallacy
of this latter conclusion is very adequately illustrated in two recent
California cases.
In the first,34 a California resident accepted a position by telephone
to work for a corporation whose headquarters were located in Denver,
Colorado. The job had been offered to him through a Denver employ-
ment agency. He was told to report to a location in Wyoming where
he filled out and signed several documents, including a contract to
work as a "mud logger" in Utah. Sometime later, he was injured in
Utah, and in 1965 he filed a claim for workmen's compensation in
California where he had been receiving medical treatment. The only
disputed issue was whether, within the meaning of sections 530515 and
3600.536 of the California Labor Code, the applicant, at the time of his
injury, was working pursuant to an employment contract made in
California. The referee found that the telephone calls between the
Denver agency and the California applicant constituted a contract made
in California, but that this contract was rescinded in Wyoming when
the applicant executed the written documents. Since the written con-
30. See H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 201 (4th ed. 1964).
31. Earlier cases basing compensation legislation on the idea of status were Cud-
ahy v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923); Lane v. Industrial Comm'r, 54 F.2d 338,
341 (2d Cir. 1931); Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 200 Cal. 579,
584, 253 P. 926, 928 (1927); Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerard, 201 Wis. 474, 477,
230 N.W. 622, 624 (1930).
More recent cases employing the idea of status are Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 104 Cal. App. 2d 27, 29, 230 P.2d 637, 638 (1951); Crilly v. Ballou,
353 Mich. 303, 307, 91 N.W.2d 493, 496 (1958); Grenier v. Alta Crest Farms, 115
Vt. 324, 329, 58 A.2d 884, 887 (1948).
32. See note 21 supra.
33. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600.5(a).
34. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 7, 434 P.2d
992, 64 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1967).
35. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
36. See note 3 supra.
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tract gave California no jurisdiction of the Utah injury, the application
was dismissed. 37 Upon petition for reconsideration, the Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board held that the oral agreement was made in
California, where the offer of employment was accepted, and that the
written contract did not extinguish it; therefore, California had jurisdic-
tion and could award compensation."8
On appeal, the court of appeal found that the employment agency
was acting as agent for the applicant and therefore the contract was
not made until the agency transmitted the employee's offer to the em-
ployer, who accepted in Denver. Therefore, the contract was made
in Colorado and California lacked jurisdiction.39 In 1967, more than
two years after the filing date, the California Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeal and reinstated the findings of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeals Board giving California jurisdiction to award com-
pensation to its injured resident.
40
A similar incident occurred in Reynolds Electric and Engineering
Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.41  The employer,
Reynolds, had an agreement with the International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers whereby one of the
union's locals was to refer workers to the employer. Pursuant to this
agreement the claimant, a resident of California, was dispatched to a
jobsite in Nevada. Upon reporting, he was instructed to fill out forms
that were to be used in obtaining a security clearance and then told to
report on the following Monday. A little over a month later while in
the scope of his employment in Nevada, he sustained an injury from
which his claim for California compensation resulted.
At a hearing before the referee, an order dismissing the applica-
tion was entered on grounds that the appeals board had no jurisdiction
since the contract of employment had been consummated in Nevada.
42
Upon reconsideration, the appeals board annulled the order of dis-
missal and awarded the claimant benefits.43 On appeal it was held by
the court of appeal that under the contract between the union and the
employer, the employer was not obligated to hire the applicant and that
the claimant upon arriving at the jobsite offered himself for employ-
ment, which offer Reynolds accepted. The acceptance having occurred
37. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 59 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264
(Ct. App.), rev'd, 68 Cal. 2d 7, 434 P.2d 992, 64 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1967).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 265.
40. See note 34 supra.
41. 65 Cal. 2d 429, 421 P.2d 96, 55 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1966).
42. 50 Cal. Rptr. 333, 335 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 65 Cal. 2d 429, 421 P.2d 96, 55
Cal. Rptr. 248 (1966).
43. 50 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
February 1970] PLACE OF CONTRACT
in Nevada, California was without jurisdiction to apply its act.
44
The California Supreme Court held that the applicant was a third
party beneficiary to the collective bargaining agreement. 45  Under that
agreement the union was made an agent of Reynolds for purposes of
transmitting an offer of employment, 46 and the offer in this case was
accepted when the applicant obtained his dispatch slip.47 Since the
requirement for a security clearance was a condition subsequent to
employment, the contract was consummated in Los Angeles and the
appeals board was justified in making the award.48
When cases of this nature arise, it is easy to lose sight of the
fundamental purpose of a workmen's compensation system. As stated
by a California court:
The primary purpose of industrial compensation is to insure to the
injured employee and those dependent upon him adequate means
of subsistence while he is unable to work and also to bring about
his recovery as soon as possible in order that he may be returned
to the ranks of productive labor.49
The system is remedial in nature and its purpose is to do justice to work-
men without expensive litigation and unnecessary delay.50 For this
purpose the California Constitution ordained
an administrative body . . . to determine any dispute or matter
arising under such legislation, to the end that the administration
of such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all cases
expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any char-
acter. 51
Once it has been determined that an injury is of a compensable nature
and the claimant is a resident, any controversy over such a fortuitous
event as where the contract of hire was consummated seems to be an
unnecessary threat to the basic principles for which the system was en-
acted.
Even more disconcerting than the expenditure by the employee of
time and funds in unnecessary litigation, is the possibility that a resi-
dent or his dependents may be denied compensation solely on the
technical ground that his contract of employment was made outside the
state. Such an unfortunate incident has already occurred at least once
in California."2
44. Id. at 336.
45. 65 Cal. 2d at 433, 421 P.2d at 99, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (1966).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See note 41 supra.
49. Union Iron Works v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 190 Cal. 33, 39, 210 P. 410,
413 (1922) (emphasis added).
50. Gill v. Hrupek, 184 Neb. 436, 439, 168 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1969).
51. CAL. CONsT. art. 20, § 21.
52. House v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 167 Ore. 257, 117 P.2d 611 (1941).
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Mr. House, a resident of California, lived near the Oregon border
and entered into a contract of employment in Oregon where he assumed
the duties of a used car salesman. He was subsequently made man-
ager at a branch location in California. While on his way from Cali-
fornia back to Oregon to attend a dealers meeting, House was fatally
injured in Oregon when the automobile in which he was a passenger
was involved in an accident. For his dependents to be eligible for a
workmen's compensation award, California Labor Code section 5305
required that the place of contract be in California, 53 while the Oregon
statute required that the place of regular employment be in that state. 4
Since the decedent met the converse of these qualifications, neither state's
requirements were satisfied and his dependents were unable to re-
cover.
55
After the House case, the California Legislature broadened the cov-
erage of workmen's compensation by enacting Labor Code section
36O.5." 6 In addition to codifying the existing law, which enabled
those hired in the state to qualify for California benefits even though
injured outside the state, subsection (a) extended this same protection
to those regularly employed in the state. This addition would pre-
sumably have been sufficient to cover House at the time of his fatal
injury in Oregon since he was at that time regularly employed in Cali-
fornia as a branch manager. Notice, however, that had he remained a
salesman in Oregon while residing in California, he would have been
dependent on the Oregon statute since he was neither hired nor reg-
ularly employed in California. In some situations this will be entirely
satisfactory, but in others it will not. For example, in the 24 states
still maintaining an elective system, an employee may not be eligible
for compensation because his employer has elected not to come within
the act.57  Also, while various state acts are similar in many respects,
they often vary in the types of injuries made compensable58 and the
amount of benefits awarded.59
53. See note 71 & accompanying text infra.
54. 167 Ore. at 265, 117 P.2d at 615.
55. Id. at 257, 117 P.2d at 611.
56. Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 1813, § 1, at 3352 (now CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600.5);
see notes 3 & 5 supra.
57. For a list of these 24 states see 3 LARSON, app. A, table 7. In those states
having an elective system, a rejection of the act by the employer results in the loss by
him of the customary common law defenses of assumption of risk, negligence of a fellow
servant and contributory negligence in actions brought by his injured employees. Id.
58. See generally Sagall, Compensable Heart Disease, 5 T m.L 29 (1969); 19
STAN. L. REv. 878 (1967).
59. Larson points out that the maximum available benefits may vary from a total
permanent disability award limited to $6000 to a payment of $35 a week for life, the
cumulative value of which in the case of a person totally disabled in his youth and
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One California resident, while working in Nevada, suffered a heart
attack during the course of his employment. In Nevada, heart injuries
are not considered to be of an industrial character and are therefore
not made compensable.60 In California, a heart attack brought on by
strain and over-exertion incident to employment is compensable.6 '
Fortunately, the offer of employment and acceptance by the employee
were made by telephone at a time when the employee was in California.
This was sufficient evidence for the court to conclude that the contract
was consummated in California, thus placing the injured employee
within the jurisdiction of the California Industrial Accident Commis-
sion." Had he been forced to rely on his Nevada remedy, he would
have gone uncompensated. Needless to say, it seems rather arbitrary
to allow a matter of such import to hinge on something as slight as
where a party to a telephone conversation was located.
As was suggested in the introduction, the contract theory has also
been carried to the opposite extreme. For example, in Commercial
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,63 the claim-
ant, a Georgia resident, responding to an advertisement for construc-
tion workers overseas, corresponded with a San Francisco firm which
forwarded to him, among other things, a memorandum of agreement
which had been drafted in the form of an offer made by the ap-
plicant. This document, when signed by the claimant and accepted
by the firm in San Francisco, resulted in a valid contract of employment.
The formalities having been completed, the claimant was sent to Saudi
Arabia where he suffered a temporary total disability. Without ever
entering California, the claimant filed a claim with the California com-
mission, and with the aid of an attorney, submitted evidence at a hear-
ing in Georgia. This evidence was forwarded in the form of a depo-
sition to the California commission, which also held a hearing. The
commission resolved, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the claim-
ant was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits under the Cali-
fornia act since the contract of employment was made in California.64
Although the situation at first may seem rather unique, the court
reached the same result in a similar fact situation one year later.65
living to a ripe old age could conceivably exceed $100,000. 3 LARSON § 84.10. See
generally id. app. B, tables 8-11 (1968).
60. NEv. REv. STATS. § 616.110 (1967).
61. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 29 Cal. 2d 492, 175
P.2d 823 (1946).
62. Reynolds Elec. & Eng'r Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 65 Cal. 2d 438,
441, 421 P.2d 102, 104, 55 Cal. Rptr. 254, 256 (1966).
63. 110 Cal. App. 2d 83, 242 P.2d 13 (1952).
64. Id. at 88, 242 P.2d at 16.
65. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 116 Cal. App. 2d 901,
254 P.2d 954 (1953). See also Benguet v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 36 Cal. App. 2d
158, 97 P.2d 267 (1939).
[Vol. 21
Several states have recognized that they have only a slight interest
in contracts to be performed entirely outside the state. Some states
even have statutes declaring, inter alia, that the act shall not apply to
an employee who is employed wholly without the state or whose de-
parture from the state is caused by a permanent assignment. 6 Other
states have reached the same result by judicial decision.
67
The California Legislature has recognized that there are occasions
when a state having a lesser interest in the injured employee may want
to cede jurisdiction to a state having a more dominant interest. 68
Basically, subsection (b) of section 3600.5 exempts an employer from
the provisions of the California workmen's compensation system if he
has provided compensation in another state for an employee who is
working within California only temporarily. 69 Thus, if all the condi-
tions in subsection (b) are met, an employee who has been injured while
working in California may be denied California compensation. If it is
conceded that California has a lesser interest in such an employee than
does the state where he is regularly employed, how much less of an
interest does California have in injured workmen who have never en-
tered the state? No doubt subsection (b) achieves a desirable result
in so far as it minimizes the obligations of the employer to satisfy
various states' insurance and compensation requirements, while at the
same time insuring the injured employee of coverage in at least one
state.70 It does, however, point out the irrationality of extending cover-
age to those connected with the state solely by reason of the place-of-
contract fiction.
A Possible Solution
In a compensation system instituted by the state to diminish
the likelihood that injured workmen or their dependents will become
public charges, some reference to residency would seem appropriate.
If it is the intention of the state to exclude those whom it deems
66. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 114-411 (1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 67(3)
(1957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-55(b) (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-33 (1953);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-169 (1962).
67. E.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Maher, 129 Ind. App. 218, 151 N.E.2d
163 (1958); Kutt v. Beaumont Birch Co., 177 Pa. Super. 352, 110 A.2d 816 (1955);
Sherk v. Department of Labor & Indus., 189 Wash. 460, 65 P.2d 1269 (1937).
A unique approach was taken in Texas and Utah by construing the phrase
"hired in this state" as having no reference to the place where the contract of hiring
took place. Jordan v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 339 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960); Buhler v. Maddison, 105 Utah 39, 140 P.2d 933 (1943).
68. See CAL. LAB R CODE § 3600.5(b).
69. Id.
70. See generally Storke & Sears, Reciprocal Exemption Provisions of Work-
men's Compensation Acts, 67 YALE L.J. 982 (1958).
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too remotely connected with the state to be afforded protection under
the local workmen's compensation provisions, residency may be used as
a sword and made a requirement. Such was the law in California be-
fore 1920. As enacted, section 5305 of the Labor Code read:
The commission shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising
out of injuries suffered without the territorial limits of this state
in those cases where the injured employee is a resident of this
state at the time of the injury and the contract of hire was made
in this state, and any such employee or his dependents shall be
entitled to the compensation or death benefits provided by this act.
71
In 1920, however, the California Supreme Court ruled unconstitu-
tional the residency requirement contained in this section on the ground
that it denied nonresidents the "privileges and immunites" allowed resi-
dents in violation of article 4, section 2 of the Federal Constitution.72
Upon the first hearing by the supreme court, the compensation award
made by the Industrial Accident Commission was annulled on the
theory that the section was unconstitutional and therefore the Indus-
trial Accident Commission was without jurisdiction. 73  On rehearing,
however, the court, in a rather unusual move, allowed the section to
remain in effect. It ruled that the Federal Constitution did not render the
section invalid but rather "automatically, and without regard to the intent
of the state legislature, extend[ed] the benefits created by the act to non-
residents."74 In another section of the opinion, the court stated:
[W]hen a privilege is granted to a citizen and withheld from
a noncitizen, the latter finds relief in the provision of the Federal
Constitution which, by operation of law, so to speak, extends the
privilege to him.
75
This decision met with almost immediate criticism7" and has not been
followed in other states having a similar requirement. 77  Despite this
decision, the legislature has never removed the residency requirement
from the wording of the section, possibly in the hopes that a reconsider-
ation will restore it to its full force.
In addition to being used as a sword, residency may be used as a
shield to protect those who, if forced to go uncompensated, could
eventually become a direct burden on the state. In this sense, residency,
71. Cal. Stats. 1917, ch. 586, § 58, at 870 (emphasis added).
72. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021
(1920), writ of error dismissed, 255 U.S. 445 (1921).
73. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 6 I.A.C. 248 (1919),
rev'd on rehearing, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021 (1920).
74. 184 Cal. 26, 39, 192 P. 1021, 1027 (1920).
75. Id. at 41, 192 P. at 1027.
76. See Annot., 12 A.L.R. 1207 (1920).
77. Residency requirements were upheld in Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v.
Goslin, 163 Md. 74, 80, 160 A. 804, 807 (1932); Tedars v. Savannah River Veneer
Co., 202 S.C. 363, 384, 25 S.E.2d 235, 243 (1943).
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rather than being a requirement, would serve as a qualification which,
when met, would entitle the one qualified to share in the full benefits
offered by the system. In this way the state can assure all of its resi-
dents the protection to which they are entitled by virtue of their resi-
dency status alone.
By providing all California residents with the maximum protec-
tion afforded under the California compensation system, the state also
protects itself by eliminating welfare claims that have their source in in-
dustrial accidents. If, for example, a California resident becomes dis-
abled by an industrial accident to the extent that he is unable to provide
for himself and his dependents, the state, in the absence of compensa-
tion coverage, may be called upon to provide welfare assistance.78 If
compensation coverage were extended to all such residents, however,
the burden of providing for such disabilities would fall on the industry,
rather than on the state, in accordance with the basic intent of work-
men's compensation legislation. The workmen's compensation system
is designed to accommodate these very circumstances and is certainly
better equipped to provide a more adequate remedy than is any general
welfare program.
A workmen's compensation system keyed to residency rather than
place of contract would also be open to less abuse. As the situation
now stands, it is possible for large employers to select a state where
the compensation benefits are small or unavailable to employees of the
class in their employ, and by making their contracts of employment in
that state, reduce or eliminate the benefits which the public policy of
the employee's home state has declared should accrue to injured work-
men.79 It would be highly unlikely that an employee, on the other
hand, would choose to reside in a state solely for the purpose of quali-
fying for compensation benefits if and when they should become neces-
sary. At the same time residency would provide a standard as easily
determinable as that of where the contract was made.
Conclusion
For these reasons, it is believed that California's interests will be
best served by (1) repealing Labor Code section 5305, which has been
rendered ineffective as a device to exclude remote claimants, and (2)
amending Labor Code section 3600.5 to the extent that the contract
qualification would be replaced by one of residency. By taking these
steps, protection under the California system would be available to (a)
78. Some situations in which compensation coverage may be denied a California
resident have already been suggested. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 1-5, 39, 44,
52 & 62 supra.
79. See Ocean Ace. & Guar. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 Ariz. 275,
283, 257 P. 644, 647 (1927). See also 3 LARsON § 87.34.
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those regularly employed in the state, and (b) those permanently re-
siding here regardless of where the injury occurred. Coverage would
also be extended to (c) those employees injured in this state except
when they are here only temporarily and are insured under the laws of
another state as now provided in subsection (b) of section 3600.5. Only
by such legislative action will the California workmen's compensation
system cover those most in need of its protection, while excluding those
only casually connected with the state.
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